To research using peer-to-peer networks as a method to access censored content, we search for signs of BitTorrent traffic within the logs. Most of those requests (99.97%) are allowed. Whereas we don’t discover any content that can be directly associated with sensitive matters like “Syrian revolution” or “Arab spring” (these files should still be shared through BitTorrent without publicly asserting the content material), we do identify content titles which relate to anti-censorship software, such as UltraSurf (2,703 requests for all variations), HideMyAss (176 requests), Auto Conceal IP (532 requests) and anonymous browsers (393 requests). Censored requests can be defined, as soon as again, with the occurrence of blacklisted keywords, e.g., proxy, in the request URL. POSTSUBSCRIPT dataset.141414BitTorrent clients send announce requests to BitTorrent servers (aka trackers) to retrieve a list of IP addresses from which the requested content might be downloaded.

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We additional categorized every area in the listing. We report the corresponding variety of censored, allowed, and proxied requests in Table 11. 4 of them are associated to anti-censorship technologies and one refers to Israel. Clearly, there’s a heavy censorship of On the spot Messaging software program, as well as news, public boards, and person-contributed streaming media sites. Note that a large number of requests containing the key phrase proxy are literally related to seemingly “non sensitive” content material, e.g., online adverts content, monitoring components or on-line APIs, however are nonetheless blocked. Show in Table 10 the top-10 categories in line with the number of censored requests. Key phrase-based mostly Filtering. We additionally establish 5 keywords that set off censorship when discovered within the URL (cs-host, cs-path and cs-question fields): proxy, hotspotshield, ultrareach, israel, and ultrasurf.

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Instagram, and Tumblr), as all requests are allowed. Nonetheless, for a number of social networks (including Fb, Linkedin, Twitter, and Flickr) many requests are blocked. We observe that several requests are censored based mostly on blacklisted keywords (e.g., proxy, Israel), thus suggesting that the destination domain shouldn’t be the precise reason of censorship. Nevertheless, requests to Netlog and Badoo are by no means allowed and there is simply a minority of requests containing blacklisted keywords, which means that these domains are all the time censored. As we explain beneath, censored requests may be categorized into two groups: (i) requests to Facebook pages with sensitive (political) content, and (ii) requests to the social platform with the blacklisted keyword proxy.

’s TOM-Skype and run experiments to understand how filtering is carried out.

Eleven countries, mostly using Planet Labs nodes, and discover DNS-based mostly and router-primarily based filtering. “weather report” about what keywords are filtered over time, while Leberknight et al. Chinese social media posts, before the Chinese government is able to censor them. Sina Weibo, and looking at phrases which are blocked on Sina Weibo’s search interface. China’s TOM-Skype and run experiments to understand how filtering is carried out. Chinese social media, based on message deletion patterns on Sina Weibo, differential popularity of phrases on Twitter vs.

This paper offered a large-scale measurement evaluation of Internet censorship in Syria. Our giant-scale analysis of real-world logs allowed us to extract information about processed requests for both censored and allowed site visitors and supply an in depth, first-of-a-sort snapshot of Syrian censorship practices. Lastly, we showed that Syrian customers attempt to evade censorship by using a number of instruments, together with net/socks proxies, Tor, VPNs, and BitTorrent. We uncovered the presence of a comparatively stealthy but fairly targeted filtering, which operates, at the same time, counting on IP addresses to block access to complete subnets, on domains to block particular web sites, and on key phrases to focus on specific content material. Prompt Messaging software program is closely censored whereas filtering of social media is restricted to specific pages. We analyzed 600GB price of logs extracted from 7 Blue Coat SG-9000 filtering proxies, which are deployed to monitor, filter, and block visitors of Syrian users.